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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade or so, physical layer security had been
an active research area drawing substantial attentions and
collaborative efforts across different societies. Complementary
to the conventional application layer security approach domi-
nantly based on cryptography that is potentially vulnerable to
quantum computationally capable eavesdropper, physical layer
security was envisioned of providing the ultimate security
from the information theoretical point of view. This area
of research was pioneered by Shannon’s foundation work
on secrete communications [1], where the ’one-time pad’
was proposed in order to achieve the perfect security. This
landmark finding inspired further intriguing research on the
physical layer security of ’wire-tap’ channel [2], where the
eavesdropper’s channel between Alice and Eve constitutes
a degraded version of the main channel between Alice and
Bob. In particular, the important notion of security capacity
was formally defined as the capacity difference between the
main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, where a positive
security capacity enables physical layer security.
The research of physical layer security became much more
complicated yet interesting when wireless communications is
considered, where the eavesdropper’s channel becomes not
necessarily degraded [3], [4], [5] in comparison to the main
channel owing to the fast variations of the wireless channel
propagation. As a benefit, the classic solution exploited the
fast varying Channel State Information (CSI) of the main
channel as the security key [6], which was assumed to be
only privately known between Alice and Bob. This solution
became naturally inappropriate in the graver condition, where
the CSI of the main channel became also publicly known to
Eve. In this challenging scenario, various signal processing
advances appeared particularly in the so-called Multiple Input
Multiple Output Multiple Eavesdropper (MIMOME) physical
layer security model [7], [8]. More explicitly, when eavesdrop-
per’s channel is optimistically assumed to be known to Alice
having multiple antennas, intelligent beam-forming constituted
effective solutions. On the other hand, when eavesdropper’s
channel is unknown to Alice but its dimension (number of
antennas) is known, the technique of generating artificial
noise [9] by Alice was found to be powerful, where the
artificial noise was pre-processed to lie in the null space of the
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main channel so as to only affect Eve adversely 1. However,
one common limitation of the above two distinct approaches
was the stringent dimensionality requirement, where Alice
must have more antennas than Eve.
In contrast to the above two design philosophies, we propose
a physical layer security solution, without the necessity of
obeying the dimensionality requirement, based on our pre-
viously proposed Generalised Pre-coded Spatial Modulation
(GPSM) scheme [12], [13]. Let us now briefly introduce the
background of GPSM scheme before embarking on our novel
design. Spatial Modulation (SM) constituted novel Multiple
Input Multiple Output (MIMO) technique, which conveys
extra information by appropriately activating the Transmit
Antenna (TA) indices, in addition to the classic modulation
schemes used on each activated TAs, as detailed in [14], [15].
By contrast, the GPSM scheme is capable of conveying extra
information by appropriately selecting the Receive Antenna
(RA) indices in addition to the classic modulation schemes
loaded on each activated RAs, as detailed in [13]. To elaborate
a little more, in [13], comprehensive performance comparisons
were carried out between the GPSM scheme as well as
the conventional MIMO scheme and the associated detection
complexity issues were discussed. Furthermore, a range of
practical issues were investigated, namely the detrimental
effects of realistic imperfect Channel State Information at the
Transmitter (CSIT), followed by a low-rank approximation in-
voked for large-dimensional MIMOs. As a further exploitation,
error probability, achievable rate and capacity analysis were
conducted in [16]. When physical layer security is consid-
ered, early work on SM considered its straightforward use,
where the security capacity is firstly reported under various
SNRs [17] and then compared to that of the single input single
output fading channel [18].
We now advocate a novel physical layer security solution
that is unique to our previously proposed GPSM scheme with
the aid of the proposed antenna scrambling. The novelty and
contribution of our paper lies in three aspects:
• principle: we introduce a ’security key’ generated at
Alice that is unknown to both Bob and Eve, where the
design goal is that the publicly unknown security key
only imposes barrier for Eve.
• approach: we achieve it by conveying useful information
only through the activation of RA indices, which is in
1Similarly, exploiting helper to generate artificial interference towards Eve
in the cooperative communications scenario is also found effective [10], [11].
turn concealed by the unknown security key in terms of
the randomly scrambled symbols used in place of the
conventional modulated symbols in GPSM scheme.
• design: we consider both Circular Antenna Scrambling
(CAS) and Gaussian Antenna Scrambling (GAS) in detail
and the resultant security capacity of both designs are
quantified and compared.
As a design merit, we find that the proposed physical layer
security solution imposes great challenge on Eve and provides
positive security capacity under both the conventional setting
of having less antennas at Eve than at Alice as well as the
disadvantageous setting that Alice is less equipped than Eve,
which is largely neglected in the literature.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the physical layer security model considered, along
with the brief introduction of GPSM for self completeness
in addition to the straightforward use of GPSM scheme in
terms of physical layer security. This motivates our proposed
antenna scrambling in Section III, where both CAS and GAS
are discussed in detail together with their security capacity
expressions. We present numerical results in Section IV and
conclude in Section V.
II. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY OF GPSM
Consider a typical physical layer security scenario with Nt
TAs at Alice and Nr RAs at Bob in the presence of Ne RAs
at Eve, where we assume Nt ≥ Nr with no constraints put on
Ne. Throughout the paper, we further assume that the MIMO
channel between Alice and Bob HB ∈ C
Nr×Nt is known
between each other and is also publicly available at Eve, while
the MIMO channel between Alice and Eve HE ∈ CNe×Nt is
only known at Eve, where both HB and HE are frequency-
flat Rayleigh fading with each entry being independent. In
this MIMOME set-up, we have the following typical system
of equations constituted by the coexistence of legal and illegal
communications
yB =HBx +wB, (1)
yE =HEx +wE , (2)
where wB ∈ CNr×1 and wE ∈ CNe×1 are the circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian noise vector with each entry
having a zero mean and a variance of σ2B and σ
2
E , i.e. we
have E[||wB||2] = Nrσ2B and E[||wE ||
2] = Neσ
2
E . The noise
wB and wE are independent between each other and are also
independent from the transmit signal x ∈ CNt×1. Finally, the
security capacity CS of the above MIMOME set-up is defined
as the capacity difference between Alice and Bob CB and
Alice and Eve CE , which is formerly expressed as
CS = CB − CE . (3)
A. Transceiver Structure of GPSM
Let us now elaborate more on our previously proposed
GPSM scheme.
1) Conceptual Description: In our GPSM scheme, a total
of Na < Nr RAs are activated at Bob so as to facilitate the
simultaneous transmission of Na data streams between Alice
and Bob, where the particular pattern of the Na RAs activated
conveys extra information in form of so-called spatial symbols
in addition to the information carried by the conventional
modulated symbols mapped to them. Hence, the number of
bits in GPSM conveyed by a spatial symbol becomes kant =
⌊log2(|Ct|)⌋, where the set Ct contains all the combinations
associated with choosing Na activated RAs out of Nr RAs.
As a result, the total number of bits transmitted by the GPSM
scheme is keff = kant + Nakmod, where kmod = log2(M)
denotes the number of bits per symbol of a conventional M -
ary modulation scheme and its alphabet is denoted by A.
Finally, it is plausible that the conventional MIMO scheme
between Alice and Bob with multiplexing of Na = Nr data
streams conveys a total of keff = Nrkmod bits altogether.
For assisting further discussions, we also let C ⊂ Ct be the
set of selected activation patterns, C(k) and C(k, i) denote the
kth RA activation pattern and the ith activated RA in the kth
activation pattern, respectively.
2) Mathematical Description: Let skm be an explicit repre-
sentation of a so-called super-symbol s ∈ CNr×1, indicating
that the RA pattern k at Bob is activated and Na conventional
modulated symbols bm = [bm1 , . . . , bmNa ]
T ∈ CNa×1 are
transmitted, where we have bmi ∈ A and E[|bmi |
2] = 1, ∀i ∈
[1, Na]. In other words, we have the relationship
s = skm = Ωkbm, (4)
where Ωk = I [:, C(k)] is constituted by the specifically
selected columns determined by C(k) of an identity matrix
of INr . Following pre-coding of P ∈ C
Nt×Nr , the resultant
transmit signal x from Alice may be written as
x =
√
β/NaPs, (5)
where β is designed for maintaining E[||x||2] = 1. The
conventional design of GPSM allows no energy leaks into
the unintended RA patterns at Bob. Hence, the classic linear
Channel Inversion (CI)-based pre-coding [19], [20] may be
used, which is formulated as
P =HHB (HBH
H
B )
−1, (6)
where the power-normalisation factor of the output power after
pre-coding is β = Nr/Tr[(HBH
H
B )
−1].
As a result, the signal observed at the Nr RAs of Bob may
be written as
yB =
√
β/NaHBPs
k
m +wB. (7)
Consequently, the joint detection of both the conventional
modulated symbols bm and of the spatial symbol k obeys the
Maximum Likelihood (ML) criterion, which is formulated as
[mˆ1, . . . , mˆNa , kˆ] = arg min
sℓn∈S
||yB −
√
β
Na
HBPs
ℓ
n||
2, (8)
where S = C×ANa denotes the super-alphabet. Alternatively,
decoupled or separate detection may also be employed, which
treats the detection of the conventional modulated symbols bm
and the spatial symbol k separately. In this reduced-complexity
variant, we have
kˆ = arg max
ℓ∈[1,|C|]
Na∑
i=1
|yBC(ℓ,i)|
2, (9)
mˆi = arg min
ni∈[1,M ]
|yB
C(kˆ,i)
−
√
β
Na
hB
C(kˆ,i)
pC(kˆ,i)bni |
2, (10)
where hB
C(kˆ,i)
is the C(kˆ, i)th row of HB representing the
channel between the C(kˆ, i)th RA at Bob and the transmitter at
Alice, while pC(kˆ,i) is the C(kˆ, i)th column of P . Thus, correct
detection is declared, when we have kˆ = k and mˆi = mi, ∀i 2.
B. Security Capacity of GPSM
Since the MIMO channel HE is intentionally and practi-
cally assumed unknown to Alice, we now investigate the secu-
rity capacity of GPSM scheme dispensing with the knowledge
of HE at Alice.
1) DCMC Capacity: The security capacity as expressed in
(3) for GPSM scheme relies on the Discrete input Continuous
output Memoryless Channel (DCMC) capacity calculations of
CB and CE , respectively. It is known that Shannon’s channel
capacity is obtained, when the input signal obeys a Gaussian
distribution [21]. Our GPSM scheme is special in the sense
that the spatial symbol conveys integer values constituted
by the RA pattern index, which does not obey the shaping
requirements of Gaussian signalling. This implies that the
channel capacity of the GPSM scheme depends on a mixture of
a continuous and a discrete input. Hence, for simplicity’s sake,
we discuss the DCMC capacity in the context of discrete-input
signalling for both the spatial symbol and for the conventional
modulated symbols mapped to it.
Before calculating CB and CE for (1) and (2) employing
GPSM scheme, we first provide a general expression of
calculating the DCMC capacity that will be used throughout
the paper. The DCMC capacity is obtained by maximizing
the mutual information between discrete input u ∈ B and
continuous output z , where we have
C = max
p(uτ ),∀τ
I(u;z)
= max
p(uτ ),∀τ
|B|∑
τ=1
∞∫
−∞
p(z,uτ ) log2
(
p(z |uτ )∑|B|
ǫ=1 p(z,uǫ)
)
dz, (11)
furthermore, we have
log2
(
p(z |uτ )∑|B|
ǫ=1 p(z,uǫ)
)
= log2
(
p(z |uτ )∑|B|
ǫ=1 p(z |uǫ)p(uǫ)
)
= − log2

 1
|B|
|B|∑
ǫ=1
p(z |uǫ)
p(z |uτ )

 = log2(|B|)− log2
|B|∑
ǫ=1
Θǫ,τ ,
(12)
2Although our security capacity discussion later does not rely on a particular
detection scheme, we include them for self-completeness.
where we let Θǫ,τ = p(z |uǫ)/p(z |uτ ). By substituting (12)
into (11) and exploiting that (11) is maximized when we have
equal probable p(uτ ), we have
C = log2(|B|)−
1
|B|
|B|∑
τ=1
E

log2
|B|∑
ǫ=1
Θǫ,τ

 . (13)
2) Security Capacity: By substituting (5) into (1) and (2),
we have the explicit relation
yB =
√
β/NaHBPs +wB, (14)
yE =
√
β/NaHEPs +wE . (15)
Hence, with perfect knowledge of GB =
√
β/NaHBP
and GE =
√
β/NaHEP being the equivalent channels, the
conditional probability of receiving yB and yE given that sτ
was transmitted are formulated as
p(yB |sτ ) ∝ exp
{
−||yB −GBsτ ||2
σ2B
}
, (16)
p(yE |sτ ) ∝ exp
{
−||yE −GEsτ ||2
σ2E
}
. (17)
As a result, we have
ΘBǫ,τ = exp
{
−||GB(sτ − sǫ) +wB||2 + ||wB||2
σ2B
}
, (18)
ΘEǫ,τ = exp
{
−||GE(sτ − sǫ) +wE ||2 + ||wE ||2
σ2E
}
, (19)
and hence the DCMC capacity of CB and CE for (14) and
(15) may be obtained upon substituting (18) and (19) into
(13), respectively and also by letting |B| = |C|MNa in (13).
Finally, the security capacity is obtained by evaluating (3) as
a difference between CB and CE .
3) Performance: Fig 1 shows the security capacity
of GPSM scheme employing CI based pre-coding when
[Nt, Nr] = [8, 4] and using QPSK modulation having different
number of activated RAs NA = [1, 2, 3] when Ne = Nr = 4
(dash) and Ne = Nt = 8 (solid). It is clearly shown in
Fig 1 that when Ne = Nr = 4, the security capacity is
positive for all Na considered and activating more RAs results
into higher security capacity. On the other hand, no positive
security capacity is found when Ne = Nt = 8 for all Na
considered as shown by solid curves. Indeed, Ne = Nt
constitutes a challenge setting in the physical layer security
literature, where typically Ne < Nt was considered. This is
because even though the eavesdropper’s channel is known by
Alice mysteriously, the celebrated strategies of transmitting
in the null space of Eve or of minimizing the signal leakage
towards Eve leave no degree of freedom for communicating
between Alice and Bob if Ne < Nt was violated. This is
also true for the typical strategy of generating artificial noise
by Alice, where the underlining assumption of Ne < Nt was
also explicitly imposed.
III. SECURITY VIA ANTENNA SCRAMBLING
We now propose a novel physical layer security scheme
exclusive to GPSM scheme with the aid of antenna scrambling.
−20 −10 0 10 20 30
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
SNR [dB]
Se
cu
rit
y 
Ca
pa
cit
y 
(bi
ts/
s/H
z)
 
 
[Na,Ne] = [1,8]
[Na,Ne] = [2,8]
[Na,Ne] = [3,8]
[Na,Ne] = [1,4]
[Na,Ne] = [2,4]
[Na,Ne] = [3,4]
[Nt,Nr] = [8,4]
Fig. 1: Security capacity of GPSM scheme employing CI based
pre-coding when [Nt, Nr] = [8, 4] and using QPSK modula-
tion having different number of activated RAs NA = [1, 2, 3]
when Ne = Nr = 4 (dash) and Ne = Nt = 8 (solid).
A. Motivation and Principle
In the security capacity of GPSM analysed in Section II-B
and showed in Fig 1, we found that the explicit and complete
knowledge of B known to both Bob and Eve constitutes one
potential source of confidentiality leakage, which allows Eve
to perform exhaustive search over B when Eve has unbounded
computational capability.
Based on this backdrop, we propose to only convey useful
information through the RA patterns in terms of spatial sym-
bols, while the conventional modulated symbols bm belonging
to a finite alphabet ofANa are purposely replaced by randomly
generated scrambled symbols, which are changed at symbol
rate and are unknown to both Bob and Eve. In other words, the
useful information in spatial domain is concealed by the time-
domain scrambled symbols with infinite possibilities, which
are in turn acted as security key.
Thus, the aim is to investigate proper scrambled symbols
that result in significant barriers only for Eve to retrieve
the useful information in spatial domain, but not for Bob.
In this light, we consider both Circular Antenna Scrambling
(CAS) and Gaussian Antenna Scrambling (GAS), where the
scrambled symbols in the former and in the latter are drawn
from a unit circle with uniformly distributed phases and
from a complex Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and
(normalised) unity variance, respectively.
B. Security Capacity of GPSM with CAS
When CAS is considered, we rewrite (4) with conven-
tional modulated symbols bm replaced by random symbols
e = [ejθ1 , . . . , ejθNa ]T ∈ CNa×1 drawn from a unit circle
with uniformly distributed phase θi, ∀i ∈ [1, Na], namely we
have
s = Ωτe, (20)
when the τ th RA pattern is activated at Bob. It is thus clear
that the useful information is contained in Ωτ only and is
concealed by the phase rotations of e.
Now, if we followed the same procedure as in Section II-B2
and adopted the same equations as expressed in (14) and (15)
by treating s as a whole in order to obtain the DCMC capacity
of CB and CE , the conditional probability calculations of (16)
and (17) become problematic. This is because the symbol
s of (20) belongs to an infinite alphabet in CAS, where its
enumeration is impossible.
On the other hand, we may only consider the spatial
domain information contained in Ωτ with finite alphabet of
C. However, the unknown randomly scrambled symbols of e,
which is also changed at symbol rate, analogously contribute
to strong channel uncertainty to both Bob and Eve. This
makes the conditional probability calculations of (16) and
(17) become again intractable since coherent detection is not
allowed with unknown e.
We thus discuss the security capacity of GPSM scheme with
CAS replying on non-coherent DCMC capacity calculations of
CB and CE based on the non-coherent transformation of (14)
and (15) with (20) been substituted, which are given as follows
rB = |GBΩτe +wB|
2 = |
∑Na
v=1
gBC(τ,v)e
jθv +wB|
2, (21)
rE = |GEΩτe +wE |
2 = |
∑Na
v=1
gEC(τ,v)e
jθv +wE |
2, (22)
where we have gBC(τ,v) and g
E
C(τ,v) stand for the C(τ, v)th
column of GB and GE respectively. Let us further elaborate
a bit more on two cases as follows.
1) Na = 1: In this special case, we have a simplified
expression of (21) and (22) given as
rB = |g
B
C(τ,1)e
jθ1 +wB |
2, (23)
rE = |g
E
C(τ,1)e
jθ1 +wE |
2, (24)
Hence, by normalising with respect to σ2B,0 = σ
2
B/2 and
σ2E,0 = σ
2
E/2, it is clear that for the ith entry of rB and
rE , we have
rB,i/σ
2
B,0 ∼ χ
2
2
[
λB,i = |g
B
C(τ,1),i|
2/σ2B,0
]
, (25)
rE,i/σ
2
E,0 ∼ χ
2
2
[
λE,i = |g
E
C(τ,1),i|
2/σ2E,0
]
, (26)
where χ22(λB,i) and χ
2
2(λE,i) stand for the non-central chi-
square distribution with degree of freedom of two and non-
centrality given by |gBC(τ,1),i|
2/σ2B,0 and |g
E
C(τ,1),i|
2/σ2E,0 as
a result of |ejθ1 |2 = 1, respectively. In particular, when CI
pre-coding of (6) is employed, where
GB =
√
β/NaHBP =
√
β/NaINr , (27)
we have λB,i = 0, ∀i 6∈ C(τ) for inactivated RAs and λB,i =
β/Naσ
2
B,0, ∀i ∈ C(τ) for activated RAs.
Thus the conditional probability of receiving rB and rE
given that Ωτ was transmitted and subjected to the knowledge
of equivalent channels GB and GE but dispensing with the
knowledge of e are formulated as
p(rB|Ωτ ) =
Nr∏
i=1
f
χ22
[
|gB
C(τ,1),i
|2/σ2
B,0
]
(
rB,i
σ2B,0
)
, (28)
p(rE |Ωτ ) =
Ne∏
i=1
f
χ22
[
|gE
C(τ,1),i
|2/σ2
E,0
]
(
rE,i
σ2E,0
)
. (29)
As a result, we have
ΘBǫ,τ =
∏Nr
i=1
f
χ22
[
|gB
C(ǫ,1),i
|2/σ2
B,0
] (rB,i/σ2B,0)∏Nr
i=1
f
χ22
[
|gB
C(τ,1),i
|2/σ2
B,0
]
(
rB,i/σ2B,0
) , (30)
ΘEǫ,τ =
∏Ne
i=1
f
χ22
[
|gE
C(ǫ,1),i
|2/σ2
E,0
] (rE,i/σ2E,0)∏Nr
i=1
f
χ22
[
|gE
C(τ,1),i
|2/σ2
E,0
]
(
rE,i/σ2E,0
) , (31)
and hence when Na = 1, the non-coherent DCMC capacity
of CB and CE for (23) and (24) may be obtained by letting
|B| = |C| and substituting (30) and (31) into (13). Finally, the
security capacity is obtained by evaluating (3).
2) Na > 1: Now we consider (21) and (22) when Na > 1,
where in this case we have
rB,i/σ
2
B,0 ∼ χ
2
2
[
λB,i = |
∑Na
v=1
gBC(τ,v),ie
jθv |2/σ2B,0
]
, (32)
rE,i/σ
2
E,0 ∼ χ
2
2
[
λE,i = |
∑Na
v=1
gEC(τ,v),ie
jθv |2/σ2E,0
]
. (33)
In contrast to Na = 1, since e is unknown to both Bob and
Eve, the non-centrality of both λB,i and λE,i of (32) and (33)
become also unavailable in general. This is because the impact
of the unknown e adds extra constructive and destructive
fading. As a result, the conditional probability calculations
similar to (28) and (29) may be intractable.
In particular, when the CI pre-coding of (6) is employed
with the beneficial structure of (27), we have λB,i = 0, ∀i 6∈
C(τ) for inactivated RAs and λB,i = β/Naσ2B,0, ∀i ∈ C(τ)
for activated RAs. Hence, the knowledge of e becomes un-
necessary for Bob in order to evaluate (32). However, the
beneficial structure similar to (27) is not seen for Eve as
HEP ∈ CNe×Nr , so the knowledge of e becomes crucial
for Eve in order to evaluate (33), resulting into a barrier.
Consequently, with the knowledge of both HB and HE ,
Eve is forced to be ’pretended’ as Bob by conducting post-
processing on yE of (15) as
y˜E =HB(H
H
EHE)
−1HHEyE ,
=GBΩτe +HB(H
H
EHE)
−1HHEwE , (34)
where by letting w˜E = HB(H
H
EHE)
−1HHEwE , the non-
coherent transformation of (34) is
r˜E = |GBΩτe + w˜E |
2 = |
∑Na
v=1
gBC(τ,v)e
jθv + w˜E |
2. (35)
Hence, by being forced to equip higher number of antennas
than Alice (Ne ≥ Nt) in order to perform the above post-
processing of (34), Eve finally becomes also capable of retriev-
ing the information concealed in the spatial domain dispensing
with the knowledge of e at the cost of noise amplification
provided σ2E > 0. More explicitly, by normalising with
respect to σ˜2E,0 = σ˜
2
E/2, we have r˜E,i/σ˜
2
E,0 ∼ χ
2
2(λ˜E,i)
with λ˜E,i = 0, ∀i 6∈ C(τ) for inactivated RAs and λ˜E,i =
β/Naσ˜
2
E,0, ∀i ∈ C(τ) for activated RAs.
Thus, when the CI pre-coding of (6) is employed and
Ne ≥ Nt, the conditional probability of receiving rB and r˜E
given that Ωτ was transmitted and subjected to the knowledge
of equivalent channels GB and GE but dispensing with the
knowledge of e are formulated as
p(rB|Ωτ ) =
Nr∏
i=1
fχ22[1[i∈C(τ)]β/Naσ2B,0]
(
rB,i
σ2B,0
)
, (36)
p(r˜E |Ωτ ) =
Nr∏
i=1
fχ22[1[i∈C(τ)]β/Naσ˜2E,0]
(
r˜E,i
σ˜2E,0
)
, (37)
where 1[·] is the indicator function that returns one (zero)
when the entry is true (false). As a result, we have
ΘBǫ,τ =
∏Nr
i=1
fχ22[1[i∈C(ǫ)]β/Naσ2B,0]
(
rB,i/σ
2
B,0
)
∏Nr
i=1
fχ22[1[i∈C(τ)]β/Naσ2B,0]
(
rB,i/σ2B,0
) , (38)
ΘEǫ,τ =
∏Nr
i=1
fχ22[1[i∈C(ǫ)]β/Naσ˜2E,0]
(
r˜E,i/σ˜
2
E,0
)
∏Nr
i=1
fχ22[1[i∈C(τ)]β/Naσ˜2E,0]
(
r˜E,i/σ˜2E,0
) , (39)
and hence when Na > 1 and CI pre-coding is employed with
Ne ≥ Nt, the non-coherent DCMC capacity of CB and CE
for (21) and (35) may be obtained by letting |B| = |C| and
substituting (38) and (39) into (13). Then, the security capacity
is obtained by evaluating (3). Finally, note that whenNe < Nt,
Eve becomes not capable of gaining any information contained
in the RA patterns without knowing e even though σ2E 7→ 0.
C. Security Capacity of GPSM with GAS
When GAS is considered, we rewrite (4) with conventional
modulated symbols bm replaced by random symbols n =
[n1, . . . , nNa]
T ∈ CNa×1 drawn from a complex Gaussian
distribution with zero-mean and (normalised) unity variance,
i.e. ni ∈ CN (0, 1), namely we have
s = Ωτn, (40)
when the τ th RA pattern is activated at Bob. Now, when
compared with the CAS case, the uncertainties arise from both
phase and amplitude. From certain perspective, we may treat
GAS as introducing multiplicative artificial noise.
Similar to CAS, since the symbol s belongs to an infinite
alphabet in GAS, we may consider the finite alphabet of C for
the spatial domain information contained in Ωτ . But unlike in
CAS, now coherent DCMC capacity calculations of CB and
CE are possible. By substituting (40) into (14) and (15), we
have
yB =GBΩτn +wB =
∑Na
v=1
gBC(τ,v)nv +wB, (41)
yE =GEΩτn +wE =
∑Na
v=1
gEC(τ,v)nv +wE . (42)
Then it is clear that for the ith entry of yB and yE as expressed
in (41) and (42), we have
yB,i ∼ CN (0,
∑Na
v=1
|gBC(τ,v),i|
2 + σ2B), (43)
yE,i ∼ CN (0,
∑Na
v=1
|gEC(τ,v),i|
2 + σ2E), (44)
where without the explicit knowledge of n, the conditional
probability of receiving yB and yE given that Ωτ was trans-
mitted and subjected to the knowledge of equivalent channels
GB and GE are formulated as
p(yB|Ωτ ) ∝ exp
{
−
Nr∑
i=1
|yB,i|
2∑Na
v=1 |g
B
C(τ,v),i|
2 + σ2B
}
, (45)
p(yE |Ωτ ) ∝ exp
{
−
Ne∑
i=1
|yE,i|2∑Na
v=1 |g
E
C(τ,v),i|
2 + σ2E
}
. (46)
As a result, we have
ΘBǫ,τ =
exp
{
Nr∑
i=1
|yB,i|
2/
(
Na∑
v=1
|gBC(τ,v),i|
2 + σ2B
)}
exp
{
Nr∑
i=1
|yB,i|
2/
(
Na∑
v=1
|gBC(ǫ,v),i|
2 + σ2B
)} , (47)
ΘEǫ,τ =
exp
{
Ne∑
i=1
|yE,i|
2/
(
Na∑
v=1
|gEC(τ,v),i|
2 + σ2E
)}
exp
{
Ne∑
i=1
|yE,i|
2/
(
Na∑
v=1
|gEC(ǫ,v),i|
2 + σ2E
)} , (48)
and hence dispensing with the knowledge of n, the DCMC
capacity of CB and CE for (41) and (42) may be obtained
by letting |B| = |C| and substituting (47) and (48) into (13).
Finally, the security capacity is obtained by evaluating (3).
However, a further look results into the following Lemma
Lemma III.1. The DCMC capacity calculation of CB based
on (47) for Bob is 0 ≤ CB ≤ log2(|C|), but the DCMC
capacity calculation of CE based on (48) returns zero capacity
for Eve, i.e. we have CE = 0.
Proof. Let us rewrite (13) here by setting |B| = |C| as
C = log2(|C|)−
1
|C|
|C|∑
τ=1
E

log2
|C|∑
ǫ=1
Θǫ,τ

 , (49)
and we further expand the following term as
E

log2
|C|∑
ǫ=1
Θǫ,τ

 = E
[
− log2
1∑|C|
ǫ=1Θǫ,τ
]
≥ − log2 E
[
1∑|C|
ǫ=1Θǫ,τ
]
≥ − log2
1∑|C|
ǫ=1 E [Θǫ,τ ]
= log2
|C|∑
ǫ=1
E [Θǫ,τ ] = log2
|C|∑
ǫ=1
E
[
eA−B
]
≥ log2

1 + |C|∑
ǫ=1,ǫ 6=τ
eE[A−B]

 , (50)
where the inequities involved during the above derivations
are followed from Jensen’s inequality. Further, A and B are
shorthand for the inner term in the exponential operator of
both the numerator and denominator, respectively, either of
(47) or of (48). Substituting (50) into (49), we have
C ≤ log2(|C|)−
1
|C|
|C|∑
τ=1
log2

1 + |C|∑
ǫ=1,ǫ 6=τ
eE[A−B]

 (51)
1) When CB is considered, let us first define Cc = C(τ) ∩
C(ǫ) as the set containing the commonly activated RAs of
two different activation patterns and thus Cd = C¯c denotes the
complementary set containing the activated RAs in difference.
We further define Cu(τ) = C(τ) ∩ Cd and C
u(ǫ) = C(ǫ) ∩
Cd as the set containing the activated RAs uniquely found in
C(τ) and C(ǫ), respectively. With the above definitions and by
exploiting the beneficial property of (27), we have
E [A−B] =
|Cd|/2∑
i=1
E [Υi]
β/Na + σ2B
−
E [Υi]
σ2B
. (52)
where we have Υi = |yBCu(τ,i)|
2 − |yBCu(ǫ,i)|
2 and E [Υi] =
β/Na. Now, when σ
2
B 7→ 0, the summation of (52) approaches
−∞, so (50) approaches zero and (51) results into CB ≤
log2(|C|). On the other hand, when σ
2
B 7→ ∞, the summation
of (52) approaches zero, so (50) approaches log2(|C|) and (51)
results into CB ≤ 0. Since we also must have CB ≥ 0, we
end up with CB = 0. Overall, we have 0 ≤ CB ≤ log2(|C|).
2) To see CE = 0, it is simple to see from (48) that
E [A−B] =
Ne∑
i=1
E
[
|yE,i|2
A′ + σ2E
]
− E
[
|yE,i|2
B′ + σ2E
]
= 0, (53)
where A′ =
∑Na
v=1 |g
E
C(τ,v),i|
2 and B′ =
∑Na
v=1 |g
E
C(ǫ,v),i|
2 and
we have E [A′] = E [B′]. As a result, (50) approaches log2(|C|)
and hence (51) results into CE ≤ 0. Since we also must have
CE ≥ 0, we end up with CE = 0.
Lemma III.1 suggests that Eve cannot follow the same ap-
proach to retrieve the useful information as Bob. Thus, sim-
ilarly to the context of CAS, by being forced to equip more
antennas than Alice (Ne ≥ Nt) and at the cost of noise
amplification provided σ2E > 0, Eve is again tried to be
’pretended’ as Bob by conducting post-processing on yE of
(42) to arrive at
y˜E =GBΩτn +HB(H
H
EHE)
−1HHEwE . (54)
Hence, we have
y˜E,i ∼ CN (0,
∑Nr
v=1
|gBC(τ,v),i|
2 + σ˜2E), (55)
and after a few manipulations, we arrive at
ΘEǫ,τ =
exp
{
Nr∑
i=1
|y˜E,i|
2/
(
Na∑
v=1
|gBC(τ,v),i|
2 + σ˜2E
)}
exp
{
Nr∑
i=1
|y˜E,i|
2/
(
Na∑
v=1
|gBC(ǫ,v),i|
2 + σ˜2E
)} , (56)
GPSM CAS GAS
ΘBǫ,τ , Θ
E
ǫ,τ (18),(19)
Na = 1 Na > 1 (47), (56)
(30), (31) (38), (39)
TABLE I: Summarized findings of {ΘBǫ,τ ,Θ
E
ǫ,τ}.
and hence dispensing with the knowledge of n, the DCMC
capacity of CE for (54) may be obtained by letting |B| = |C|
and substituting (56) into (13). Then, the security capacity
is obtained by evaluating (3). Finally, again note that when
Ne < Nt, Eve becomes not capable of gaining any information
contained in the RA patterns without knowing e even though
σ2E 7→ 0, since the operation of (54) is not allowed.
D. Further Discussions
1) Example: We now provide an example to better aid
the conceptual understanding of our proposed physical layer
security of GPSM with antenna scrambling. Fig 2 shows the
plot of 1000 samples of the received signal yB at Bob and yE
at Eve when CI pre-coding aided GPSM is employed at Alice
with [Nt, Nr, Ne] = [8, 4, 4] under a particular MIMO channel
realisation ofHB andHE when SNR is set to 30dB to remove
the disturbance of noise. Thus we focus on the effect of CAS
and GAS on the realisations of yB and yE . In Fig 2, we include
three different cases correspond to three rows of subplots in
pair for yB (left) and yE (right), respectively. On each subplot,
the received signal samples of each individual RA are detailed
in four miniplots, each with horizontal axis and vertical axis
represent real and imaginary part of yB,i, ∀i ∈ [1, Nr] or
yE,i, ∀i ∈ [1, Ne].
The first row of Fig 2 illustrate the scenario, where Na = 1
and employing CAS with first RA been activated. It can be
seen from Fig 2a that the received signal samples of the first
RA at Bob is clearly distinguishable with respect to that of
the rest RAs. Moreover, being a circle at the first RA implies
that its non-coherent transformation (magnitude) constitutes a
constant value. On the other hand, the four distinguishable
circles observed at Eve from Fig 2b imply that Eve is also
unaffected by CAS, but failing to capture the correct pattern
as compared to Bob.
When the second row of Fig 2 is considered, where Na > 1
and employing CAS with first and second RAs been activated.
It can be seen from Fig 2c that the received signal samples
of the first two RAs are stand-out clearly from the rest, being
unaffected by the unknown knowledge of e. However, Eve
is completely messed up by the confusion of CAS as seen
from Fig 2d, where a large overlap can be found in these four
miniplots. Finally, we consider the third row of Fig 2 when
GAS is employed. Again, clear patterns are observed at Bob
as seen in Fig 2e but indistinguishable clouds are found at Eve
as seen in Fig 2f.
2) Remarks: We infer that the effect of CAS is analogously
to introduce artificial phase ambiguity at Eve, while the effect
of GAS is analogously to introduce artificial multiplicative
noise. It is also worth noting that the proposed antenna
scrambling is different from the so-called directional modu-
lation [22], [23], [24], although the useful information is also
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Fig. 2: Plot of 1000 samples of the received signal yB at Bob
and yE at Eve when CI pre-coding aided GPSM is employed
at Alice with [Nt, Nr, Ne] = [8, 4, 4] under a particular MIMO
channel realisation of HB andHE when SNR is set to 30dB.
Three different cases correspond to three rows of subplots in
pair for yB (left) and yE (right), respectively. On each subplot,
the received signal samples of each individual RA are detailed
in four miniplots, each with horizontal axis and vertical axis
represent real and imaginary part.
carried only the antenna level. Without using antenna scram-
bling as we proposed at the baseband, by varying the antenna
near-field electromagnetic boundary in analogy domain, the
desired phase and amplitude of the far-filed electromagnetic
boundary is modulated at the intended direction, which is
indistinguishable to undesired directions.
Finally, for clarity, we summarize the main findings of
{ΘBǫ,τ ,Θ
E
ǫ,τ} for calculating the DCMC capacity {CB, CE}
and security capacity CS of our physical layer security for
GPSM scheme with both CAS and GAS in Table I. We also
emphasize that our proposed design imposes tough require-
ment on Eve by enforcing it to equip with Ne ≥ Nt antennas
in order to start intercepting and even in this challenging set-
ting, substantial positive security capacity can still be observed
as shown in next Section.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Let us now illustrate the numerical results of our advocated
physical layer security of GPSM scheme with antenna scram-
bling. Throughout the simulations, we let σ2B = σ
2
E > 0 and
also Ne = Nt without loss of generosity. As discussed, when
Ne < Nr, Eve is not capable of intercepting the communi-
cations between Alice and Bob, resulting into CE = 0 and
hence perfect security may be guaranteed by our design even
when σ2E 7→ 0. Thus, we focus on the challenging scenario
of Ne = Nt that was largely neglected in the literature. Note
that this is the least number of antennas required for Eve to
perform (34) and (54).
A. Performance with Antenna Scrambling
1) Na = 1: The upper subplot of Fig 3 shows the security
capacity of GPSM scheme with both CAS (solid) and GAS
(dash) employing CI based pre-coding when Na = 1 having
different combinations of [Nt, Nr] and Ne = Nt. It is clear
that the security capacity is higher when employing GAS for
all different combinations considered, although the higher the
ratio of Nt/Nr, the lower the difference of security capacity.
Also, as expected, along with increasing the ratio of Nt/Nr,
the security capacity increases in general for both CAS and
GAS schemes.
2) Na > 1 and CAS: The lower subplot of Fig 3 shows
the security capacity of GPSM with CAS employing CI based
pre-coding when [Nt, Nr] = [16, 8] having different number
of activated RAs Na = [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and Ne = Nt. Firstly,
when including Na = 1 for bench-marker, the lower subplot
of Fig 3 shows that activating more RAs provides higher and
wider security capacity region than opting for larger ratio of
Nt/Nr as indicated by the apparent comparisons between solid
curves and dashed curves, despite that they are operated on
different SNR ranges. Further, we can also see that along with
increasing Na = [2, 3, 4], the security capacity increases. In
particular, the security capacity region of activating Na = 2
and Na = 3 RAs at Bob constitute an approximately hori-
zontal shifted security capacity region of activating Na = 6
and Na = 5 RAs. This is intuitively true since activating
Na = 6 (Na = 5) RAs at Bob is conceptually equivalent to
deactivating Nt −Na = 2 (Nt−Na = 3) RAs at Bob, where
in both cases, we have the maximum security capacity being
CS = keff = 4 bits/s/Hz (CS = keff = 5 bits/s/Hz). Finally,
we observe that the highest security capacity is achieved
when Na = 4 with the maximum security capacity being
CS = keff = 6 bits/s/Hz.
3) Na > 1 and GAS: Fig 4 shows the security capacity
of GPSM with GAS employing CI based pre-coding when
[Nt, Nr] = [16, 8] (upper) having different number of activated
RAs Na = [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and Ne = Nt as well as its security
capacity difference with respect to that of CAS (lower). It
can be seen from the upper subplot of Fig 4 that the security
capacity offered by GAS is also substantial, which is similar
to the case of CAS. Again, along with increasing Na =
[1, 2, 3, 4], the security capacity increases and the mirroring
effects also appear between Na = [1, 2, 3] and Na = [7, 6, 5]
accordingly. It is thus interesting to investigate the security
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CAS (solid) and GAS (dash) employing CI based pre-coding
when Na = 1 having different combinations of [Nt, Nr]
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and Ne = Nt.
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Fig. 4: Security capacity of GPSM with GAS employing CI
based pre-coding when [Nt, Nr] = [16, 8] (upper) having
different number of activated RAs Na = [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and
Ne = Nt and its security capacity difference with respect to
that of CAS (lower).
capacity difference between CAS and GAS, which is shown in
the lower subplot of Fig 4, where we can see that the security
capacity differences when Na > 1 alternate around zero. This
indicates no dominant superiority between CAS and GAS,
where both offer substantial security capacity with different
regions of operation under the setting of Ne = Nt.
B. Further Investigations
1) Robustness to CSIT Error: Like in all pre-coding
schemes, an important aspect related to GPSM is its resilience
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Fig. 5: Security capacity of GPSM with GAS employing CI
based pre-coding when [Nt, Nr, Na] = [16, 8, 2] and Ne = Nt
under CSIT error of σi = [0.3, 0.4, 0.5] (upper) and antenna
correlations of ρ = [0.3, 0.4, 0.5] (lower).
to CSIT inaccuracies. In this paper, we let HB = HB,a +
HB,i, where HB,a represents the matrix hosting the average
CSI, with each entry obeying the complex Gaussian distribu-
tion of hB,a ∼ CN (0, σ2B,a) and HB,i is the instantaneous
CSI error matrix obeying the complex Gaussian distribution
of hB,i ∼ CN (0, σ2B,i), where we have σ
2
B,a + σ
2
B,i = 1. As
a result, only HB,a is available at Alice for pre-processing,
while we assume perfectHB at Bob and Eve. The upper sub-
plot of Fig 5 shows the security capacity of GPSM with GAS
employing CI based pre-coding when [Nt, Nr, Na] = [16, 8, 2]
and Ne = Nt under CSIT error of σi = [0.3, 0.4, 0.5]. It is
clear from the upper subplot of Fig 5 that, as expected, the
higher the CSIT error imposed, the lower security capacity
exhibited.
2) Robustness to Channel Correlations: Another typical
impairment is antenna correlation. The correlated MIMO chan-
nels are modelled by the widely-used Kronecker model [25],
which are written as HB = (R
1/2
A,t )HB,0(R
1/2
B,r)
T and HE =
(R
1/2
A,t)HE,0(R
1/2
E,r)
T , with HB,0 and HE,0 representing the
original MIMO channel imposing no correlation, while RA,t,
RB,r and RE,r represent the correlations at the transmitter
of Alice and receiver of Bob and Eve, respectively, with the
correlation entries given by RA,t(i, j) = ρ
|i−j|
A,t , RB,r(i, j) =
ρ
|i−j|
B,r , RE,r(i, j) = ρ
|i−j|
E,r . In this paper, we assume ρA,t =
ρB,r = ρE,r = ρ. The lower subplot of Fig 5 shows the
security capacity of GPSM with GAS employing CI based
pre-coding when [Nt, Nr, Na] = [16, 8, 2] and Ne = Nt under
antenna correlations of ρ = [0.3, 0.4, 0.5]. We can see from the
lower subplot of Fig 5 that the security capacity of GPSM with
GAS is not necessarily reduced or improved by increasing the
degree of channel correlations. Rather, the positive security
capacity region is shifted towards higher SNR range, whilst
increasing the value of channel correlations.
3) Ne > Nt: Fig 6 shows the security capacity (upper)
and outage security capacity (lower) when SNR = 10dB
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Fig. 6: Security capacity (upper) and outage security capacity
(lower) when SNR = 10dB of GPSM with GAS employing
CI based pre-coding when [Nt, Nr, Na] = [16, 8, 2] and Ne =
[16, 18, 20, 22, 24].
of GPSM with GAS employing CI based pre-coding when
[Nt, Nr, Na] = [16, 8, 2] and Ne = [16, 18, 20, 22, 24]. It is
clear from the upper subplot of Fig 6 that the higher the
number of receive antennas Ne at Eve, the lower and narrower
positive security capacity exhibited, as Eve’s capability is
naturally improved. Also, we can see from the lower subplot
of Fig 6 that the higher the number of receive antennas Ne at
Eve, the lower the span of positive security capacity values.
For example, when Ne = 22, the security capacity ranges upto
1 bits/s/Hz, while when Ne = 16, the security capacity ranges
upto nearly 4 bits/s/Hz. Both figures suggest that our proposed
physical layer security of GPSM with antenna scrambling
works reasonably well even under Ne > Nt.
V. CONCLUSION
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